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WILL BEQUESTS ATTENUATE THE PREDICTED MELTDOWN
IN STOCK PRICES WHEN BABY BOOMERS RETIRE?
Andrew B. Abel*
Abstract—General equilibrium models that predict a reduction in asset
prices when baby boomers retire typically assume that people consume all
of their wealth before they die. However, many people hold substantial
wealth when they die. I develop a rational expectations, general equilib-
rium model with a bequest motive. In this model, a baby boom increases
stock prices, and stock prices are rationally anticipated to fall when the
baby boomers retire, even though consumers continue to hold assets
throughout retirement. The continued high demand for assets by retired
baby boomers does not attenuate the fall in the price of capital.
I. Introduction
THE phenomenal increase in stock prices in the UnitedStates during the past several years has many potential
explanations. One popular explanation is that, as baby
boomers save for retirement, their aggregate demand for
capital is very large, which drives up the price of capital.
This explanation then goes on to predict that, when the baby
boomers retire, they will sell large amounts of capital and
drive down its price. Jim Poterba (2001) uses the term “asset
market meltdown hypothesis” to refer to this predicted
decline in stock prices.
Poterba examines data on asset holdings in several cross
sections of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and
raises an important challenge to the asset market meltdown
hypothesis. He points out that recent theoretical models of a
market meltdown assume that baby boomers will sell all of
their assets during their retirement years,1 and he argues that
this assumption is inconsistent with the data on asset hold-
ings in the SCF. Subject to the difficulty of disentangling
time effects, cohort effects, and age effects, Poterba con-
cludes from his tables 1 and 2 that, although consumers
rapidly accumulate assets while they are of working age,
they decumulate assets during retirement much less rapidly
than would be predicted by a simple life cycle model with
no bequest motive and no lifetime uncertainty. He extrapo-
lates from these results to conclude that the baby boomers
will not sell all of their assets during retirement, and he
further concludes that the asset market meltdown hypothesis
is incorrect in its prediction that the price of capital will fall.
Poterba also looks for empirical evidence of an effect of
demographic variables on asset prices and returns. He finds
a very weak effect of demographic variables on asset re-
turns, but he finds a more substantial effect of demographic
variables on stock prices using data he generates on “pro-
jected asset demands.” Poterba calculates projected asset
demands by combining age-specific asset holdings from his
table 2 with actual and projected age-specific populations in
each year. He finds (table 13) some evidence of a positive
relationship between projected asset demands and the price-
dividend ratio over various historical sample periods dating
back to 1926. Looking forward, the projected asset demands
reported in his table 5 increase over the next two decades
and then remain fairly constant for the succeeding three
decades. Because projected asset demands do not fall when
the baby boomers retire, Poterba rejects the asset market
meltdown hypothesis while maintaining the notion that the
baby boom contributed to the increase in stock prices.
Poterba has demonstrated that, in contrast to the predic-
tions of a life cycle model with no bequest motive and no
lifetime uncertainty, the projected demand for assets will not
decline sharply when the baby boomers are retired. I will
accept this conclusion, but I will argue here that the failure
of the demand for capital to fall in the future does not imply
that the price of capital will not fall. Specifically, taking
account of the supply of capital as well as its demand, the
equilibrium price of capital may fall when baby boomers
retire, even if the demand for capital by retired baby
boomers remains high.
In this paper, I present a general equilibrium, overlap-
ping-generations model with convex adjustment costs,
which generate an endogenous price of capital as in Abel
(2000). I include a bequest motive so that consumers will
choose not to consume all of their wealth during retirement.
The inclusion of a bequest motive provides a framework for
addressing the extent to which the predicted meltdown in
asset prices is attenuated by taking account of the fact that
consumers do not consume all of their wealth during retire-
ment. The equilibrium of the model has the following
properties: (i) the price of capital rises when a large cohort
of consumers—baby boomers—is young and working,
which is consistent with Poterba’s tables 5 and 13; (ii) the
price of capital is anticipated to fall when baby boomers
retire; (iii) young baby boomers optimally choose to hold
capital even with the anticipation that its price will fall; (iv)
consumers do not completely decumulate their assets during
retirement, consistent with Poterba’s tables 1 and 2; and yet
(v) the dynamic behavior of the equilibrium price of capital
is unaffected by the strength of the bequest motive, so that
assets held by old consumers for the purpose of making
bequests do not attenuate the predicted drop in the price of
capital when baby boomers retire.
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I develop and analyze the formal overlapping generations
model in section III. Before presenting this formal model, I
present in section II Poterba’s heuristic model and augment
it to include the supply of capital as well as the demand for
capital. The discussion in section II provides an intuitive
preview of the formal results in section III.
II. A Heuristic Model
Poterba presents a simple stylized, or heuristic, model to
illustrate the effects of demographic variables on the price
of capital. I will begin by presenting this model, with
slightly modified notation.
Consider a closed economy with overlapping generations
of consumers who live for two periods. All consumers who
are born in the same period are identical. Let Nt be the
number of consumers born at the beginning of period t.
They inelastically supply one unit of labor when they are
young, and they do not work when they are old, so the
amount of labor employed in period t is Nt. Let
ht11 ;
Nt11
Nt
(1)
be the birth rate in period t 1 1, and assume that the birth
rate is a serially uncorrelated random variable.
To make the analysis transparent, Poterba makes addi-
tional simplifying assumptions. He assumes that the capital
stock cannot be augmented by investment and does not
depreciate. Therefore, Kt, the aggregate capital stock held at
the beginning of period t, remains constant over time. He
also assumes that, in each period, the wage income of each
young consumer equals one unit of output2 and that young
consumers save a constant fraction s of their wage income.
Therefore, the aggregate saving of the cohort of young
consumers born at the beginning of period t is Nts. All of
this saving is used to purchase Kt11, the aggregate capital
stock to be carried into period t 1 1, at a price of qt per unit
of capital in period t. Therefore,
qtKt11 5 Nts, (2)
which is equivalent to Poterba’s equation (1).
Equation (2) can be interpreted as the demand for capital,
Kt11, at the end of period t as a function of the price of
capital, qt, given Nt and s. If the capital stock remains
constant, as in Poterba’s stylized model, then the price of
capital can be determined directly from this demand curve.
In particular, the price of capital, qt, is proportional to Nt,
the number of workers in the economy. Thus, an increase in
Nt will increase the price of capital, qt, as the large cohort
of workers bids up the price of the fixed capital stock.
Poterba goes on to claim that, when the large cohort of
workers retires and sells its capital, it will drive down the
price of capital. This claim is based on the implicit assump-
tion that a baby boom in period t, which generates a large
cohort of workers, Nt, will be followed by a decrease in the
size of the working population in the following generation.
That is, Poterba assumes that Nt11 is smaller than Nt.
Equivalently, he assumes that, if the birth rate in period t,
ht, is large, then the birth rate in the following period, ht11,
must not only be small, it must be less than one.3 This
assumption requires strong negative serial correlation in the
birth rate across successive generations.4 However, if the
economy has a fluctuating birth rate that always exceeds
one, so that the population of workers always grows over
time, then, in the stylized model introduced by Poterba and
represented by equation (2), the price of capital increases in
every period.
In the presence of a growing population, the price of
capital in equation (2) can be prevented from growing in
every period by allowing the capital stock to grow over
time. To preview the rational expectations, general equilib-
rium model that I present in section III, suppose that the
aggregate supply curve of capital slopes upward so that the
(gross) growth rate of the capital stock, Kt11Kt , is an increas-
ing function of the price of capital. In particular, suppose
that
Kt11 5 kKtqtl, (3)
where k . 0 and l . 0.5 Equation (3) represents the supply
of capital, Kt11, at the end of period t as a function of the
price of capital, qt, for a given value of Kt.
To determine the equilibrium price of capital, I will solve
the demand and supply curves in equations (2) and (3)
simultaneously. First, divide both sides of equation (3) by
Nt11, and use the definition of the birth rate, ht11, in
equation (1) to obtain
kt11 5 kkt
1
ht11
qtl, (4)
where kt [ Kt/Nt is the capital-labor ratio in period t. To
express the capital-labor ratio kt as a function of qt, use
equation (3) to substitute for Kt11 in equation (2), and use
the definition of kt to obtain
kt 5
1
k
sqt2~11l!. (5)
2 The aggregate production function implicitly underlying this model is
Yt 5 Nt 1 f(Kt), where Yt is aggregate output. With this specification of
the production function, the marginal product of labor always equals one,
regardless of the level of the capital stock.
3 A birth rate equal to one in the model corresponds to one child per
person, which is equivalent to two children per woman.
4 In contrast, if the birth rate is i.i.d. across successive generations, an
increase in Nt, which increases qt, is no more likely to be followed by a
decrease in the number of workers or in the price of capital in the
following period than at any other time.
5 If l were equal to zero and if k were equal to one, the capital stock
would be constant over time, as in Poterba’s model.
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To obtain an expression for the dynamic behavior of the
price of capital, qt, substitute equation (5) into equation (4)
to obtain
ln qt 5
1
1 1 l ln qt21 2
1
1 1 l ln k 1
1
1 1 l ln ht. (6)
Because l . 0, if the birth rate, ln ht, is serially
uncorrelated with unconditional mean E(ln h), then ln qt
follows a stationary AR(1) process with unconditional mean
1
l
~E$ln h% 2 ln k!. Thus, starting from the unconditional
mean price of capital, an increase in the birth rate ht causes
an increase in the price of capital qt. Consistent with the
asset market meltdown hypothesis, the price of capital, ln
qt11, is anticipated to fall toward its unconditional mean in
the following period.
In the heuristic model presented here, as well as in the
general equilibrium models in Abel (2000) and Brooks
(1999), consumers spend all of their resources in the final
period of life, contrary to the empirical findings reported by
Poterba in his tables 1 and 2. Poterba argues that, because
consumers continue to hold assets throughout old age, the
aggregate demand for capital does not fall when the baby
boomers age, and, hence, contrary to the asset market
meltdown hypothesis, the price of capital will not plunge
when the baby boomers are retired. I was intrigued by
Poterba’s argument that the meltdown would be attenuated
by the fact that people hold substantial assets until death,
and I set out to examine the extent of this attenuation in the
context of a rational expectations, general equilibrium
model that I present in section III. To address this issue, I
assume that consumers have bequest motives, and thus hold
assets at the time of death. In the specification I use in
section III, the equilibrium dynamics of the price of capital
are completely unaffected by the presence of a bequest
motive and the consequent holding of assets at the time of
death. Therefore, a bequest motive does not attenuate the
predicted decline in stock prices when the baby boom
retires.
Before proceeding to the general equilibrium model, I
will use the analysis in the current section to illustrate the
invariance of the price of capital to the strength of the
bequest motive. Figure 1 illustrates the demand and supply
curves for capital, Kt11, in period t as a function of the price
of capital, qt. The solid downward-sloping curve, K1D, is the
demand for capital in equation (2) in the absence of a
bequest motive. The solid upward-sloping curve, K1S, is the
supply of capital in equation (3) in the absence of a bequest
motive. Thus, in the absence of a bequest motive, equilib-
rium in the market for capital in period t is represented by
point E.
Now consider an otherwise-identical economy with a
bequest motive. The amount of saving, and hence the
demand for capital, in period t will be higher in the econ-
omy with a bequest motive than in the economy without a
bequest motive. Thus, the demand for capital in an economy
with a bequest motive is represented by K2D, which is to the
right of K1D.6 If the supply curve of capital were invariant to
the strength of the bequest motive (which is implicitly
assumed by Poterba), the equilibrium in the economy with
a bequest motive would be represented by point G, where
the price of capital is higher than in the absence of a bequest
motive. However, an economy with a bequest motive will
have a higher capital stock in each period than an otherwise-
identical economy without a bequest motive. Therefore, in
period t, the capital stock, Kt, is higher in the presence of a
bequest motive than in its absence, and, hence, the supply
curve of capital in the economy with a bequest motive, K2S,
is to the right of the supply curve in the absence of a bequest
motive, K1S. The equilibrium in the economy with a bequest
motive is represented by point F, where K2D and K2S inter-
sect, with a higher capital stock, but the same price of
capital, as at point E. In the parametric rational expecta-
tions, general equilibrium model in section III, I show that
the equilibrium price of capital, qt, is invariant to the
strength of the bequest motive, which means that rightward
shifts of the supply and demand curves in figure 1 are of the
same size. Because the equilibrium price of capital is not
affected by the strength of the bequest motive, the asset
market meltdown is not attenuated by the introduction of a
bequest motive.
III. A General Equilibrium Model with a Baby Boom
and an Endogenous Price of Capital
In this section, I present a rational expectations, general
equilibrium model in which the wage income of workers is
determined endogenously, and the asset demands of young
6 The economy with a bequest motive can be viewed as having a higher
value of saving per worker, s, than does the economy without a bequest
motive.
FIGURE 1.—SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR CAPITAL
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and old consumers maximize expected lifetime utility. This
model is a simplified version of the model in Abel (2000),
except that it includes a bequest motive so that consumers
will not completely decumulate their assets in old age.
As in section II, consider a closed economy with over-
lapping generations of consumers who live for two periods.
At the beginning of period t, Nt identical consumers are
born, and they each inelastically supply one unit of labor in
period t and earn wage income wt, which I will derive after
introducing the production technologies below. These con-
sumers do not work in period t 1 1 when they are old.
A. Production Technologies
There are two production technologies. One technology,
which I will call the consumption goods technology, pro-
duces output that can be either consumed or used as an input
to the other technology, which is the capital adjustment
technology.
The consumption goods technology uses capital and labor
to produce output. Let Kt be the aggregate capital stock at
the beginning of period t, let Yt be the aggregate output of
the consumption goods technology in period t, and assume
that
Yt 5 AKtaNt12a, where 0 , a , 1 and A . 0. (7)
The capital adjustment technology uses output from the
consumption goods technology together with capital to
produce capital for use in the following period. Suppose that
the capital adjustment technology is
Kt11 5 aItfKt12f, (8)
where a . 0, 0 , f , 1, and investment, It, is the
aggregate quantity of output from the consumption goods
technology used in the capital adjustment technology. Be-
cause the curvature parameter f is strictly between zero and
one, the capital stock in period t 1 1 is an increasing and
concave function of investment, It. The concavity of this
function captures the convex costs of adjustment.
The price of capital at the end of period t, qt, is the
amount of consumption goods in period t that must be used
to produce an additional unit of capital for use in period t 1
1. Thus, qt 5 S]Kt11]It D
21
, which can be calculated using
equation (8) to obtain7
qt 5
1
af
S ItKtD
12f
. (9)
The value, in terms of consumption goods in period t, of the
capital stock carried into period t 1 1 equals the product of
qt from equation (9) and Kt11 from equation (8), which is
qtKt11 5
1
f
It. (10)
Factor markets are perfectly competitive so that each
factor of production earns its marginal product. Thus, using
equation (7), the wage rate in period t, wt, is
wt 5 ~1 2 a!
Yt
Nt
. (11)
Because capital is used in both the consumption goods
technology and the capital adjustment technology, capital
earns rentals in both technologies. The rental earned by a
unit of capital in the consumption goods technology in
period t is a
Yt
Kt
. The rental earned by a unit of capital in the
capital adjustment technology in period t is the marginal
product of capital in that technology,
]Kt11
]Kt
, multiplied by
the current price of next period’s capital, qt. This rental can
be calculated using equations (8) and (9) to obtain
1 2 f
f
It
Kt
. Therefore, the total rental to capital is
nt 5 a
Yt
Kt
1
1 2 f
f
It
Kt
. (12)
The (gross) rate of return on capital held from period t 2 1
to period t, Rt, equals the rental on capital, nt, divided by
the price paid for the capital in period t 2 1, qt21.
Therefore,
Rt 5
aYt 1
1 2 f
f
It
qt21Kt
. (13)
B. Consumer Behavior
A consumer born at the beginning of period t chooses
consumption when young, ct, consumption when old, xt11,
and a bequest, bt12, to be divided equally among the
consumer’s ht11 children at the beginning of period t 1 2
when the consumer’s children are beginning the second
period of life. Each consumer born at the beginning of
period t receives a bequest
bt11
ht
at the beginning of period
t 1 1. Thus, the present value of the lifetime resources of
a consumer born at the beginning of period t is
ut ; wt 1
1
Rt11
bt11
ht
. (14)
7 Equations (8) and (9) imply that Kt11Kt 5 a
1~12f!~fqt!f~12f!, which
implies that, in equation (3), l 5 f1 2 f and k 5 a
1(12f)ff(12f).
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The lifetime budget constraint of a consumer born at the
beginning of period t is
ct 1
1
Rt11
xt11 1
1
Rt11
1
Rt12
bt12 5 ut. (15)
A consumer born at the beginning of period t has the utility
function
Ut 5 ln ct 1 bEt$ln xt11% 1 gEt$ln bt12%, (16)
where 0 , b # 1, g $ 0, and Et{ } denotes the expectation
conditional on information available in period t. The con-
sumer chooses ct, xt11, and bt12 to maximize the utility
function in equation (16) subject to the budget constraint in
equation (15). It can be shown that the optimal value of
consumption when young is8
ct 5
1
1 1 b 1 g ut. (17)
At the beginning of period t 1 1, all of the capital in the
economy, Kt11, is held by the Nt consumers who were born
at the beginning of period t. They acquired some of this
capital by saving when they were young, and they inherited
the remaining portion of their capital. The rental accruing to
the aggregate capital held by these consumers is nt11Kt11,
where nt11 is the rental to capital in equation (12). There-
fore, each owner of capital has resources equal to
nt11
Kt11
Nt
5
1
Nt
SaYt11 1 1 2 ff It11D . (18)
The owners of this capital (who were born at the beginning
of period t) are in the final period of their lives in period t 1
1, and they choose consumption, xt11, and a bequest, bt12,
to maximize b ln xt11 1 gEt11{ln bt12} subject to xt11
1
1
Rt12
bt12 5
aYt11 1
1 2 f
f
It11
Nt
. The optimal values of
xt11 and bt12 are
xt11 5
b
b 1 g
1
Nt
SaYt11 1 1 2 ff It11D (19)
and
bt12
Rt12
5
g
b 1 g
1
Nt
SaYt11 1 1 2 ff It11D . (20)
Decreasing the time subscript by one unit in equation (20)
implies that a consumer born at the beginning of period t
receives a bequest with present value (as of the beginning of
period t) equal to
1
Rt11
bt11
ht
5
g
b 1 g
1
Nt
SaYt 1 1 2 ff ItD . (21)
The present value of lifetime resources of a consumer
born at the beginning of period t can be calculated by
substituting the wage from equation (11) and bequest re-
ceived from equation (21) into equation (14) to obtain
ut 5 ~1 2 a!
Yt
Nt
1
g
b 1 g
1
Nt
SaYt 1 1 2 ff ItD . (22)
C. Aggregate Behavior
Let Ut [ Ntut denote the aggregate present value of
lifetime resources of the cohort born at the beginning of
period t. Equation (22) implies that
Ut ; Ntut 5 S1 2 bb 1 g aDYt
1
g
b 1 g
1 2 f
f
It.
(23)
Let Ct [ Ntct be the aggregate consumption in period t of
the cohort of young consumers. Equations (17) and (23)
imply that
Ct 5
1
1 1 b 1 g FS1 2 bb 1 g aDYt
1
g
b 1 g
1 2 f
f
ItG . (24)
Let Xt [ Nt21xt be the aggregate consumption in period t of
the cohort of Nt21 old consumers (who were born at the
beginning of period t 2 1). Equation (19) implies that
Xt 5
b
b 1 g
SaYt 1 1 2 ff ItD . (25)
The aggregate consumption of all consumers in period t is
calculated by adding Ct from equation (24) to Xt from
equation (25) to obtain
8 Define wt11 [ (ut 2 ct) Rt11 and Vt11(wt11) [ maxxt11,bt12b ln
xt11 1 gEt11{ln bt12} subject to xt11 1
bt12
Rt12
5 wt11. The optimal
values of xt11 and bt12 are xt11 5
b
b 1 g
wt11 and bt12 5
g
b 1 g
wt11Rt12.
Therefore, Vt11(wt11) 5 (b 1 g) ln wt11 1 b ln
b
b 1 g
1 g ln
g
b 1 g
1 gEt11
$ln Rt12%. The optimal value of ct maximizes ln ct 1 Et{Vt11(wt11)} which is
the value of ct that maximizes ln ct 1 (b 1 g)Et{ln wt11}, or equivalently, the
value of ct that maximizes ln ct 1 (b 1 g) ln (ut 2 ct). The first-order
condition for this maximization is
1
ct
5
b 1 g
ut 2 ct
, which implies that (1 1 b 1
g)ct 5 ut.
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Ct 1 Xt 5
1
1 1 b 1 g F ~1 1 ab!Yt
1 ~1 1 b!
1 2 f
f
ItG . (26)
Recall that Yt is the aggregate output of the consumption
goods technology in period t, and It is the amount of this
output used as an input to the capital adjustment technology
rather than consumed. Thus,
It 5 Yt 2 Ct 2 Xt. (27)
Now substitute aggregate consumption from equation (26)
into equation (27) to obtain9
It 5 cYt, (28)
where
0 , c ; f
~1 2 a!b 1 g
1 1 b 1 gf , 1. (29)
The investment-output ratio c depends on the strength of
the bequest motive g. In the special case in which g 5 0, the
investment-output ratio is c 5 f
b
1 1 b ~1 2 a! as in the
laissez-faire special case in Abel (2000, section 5). To
determine the effect of g on c, differentiate the expression
for c in equation (29) with respect to g to obtain
]c
]g
5 ~1 2 c!
f
1 1 b 1 gf . 0. (30)
Equation (30) implies that comparing two economies
with identical technologies, and preferences that are identi-
cal except for the value of g, the economy with a stronger
bequest motive (higher g) will have a higher investment-
output ratio, c.
D. The Dynamic Behavior of Aggregates
The investment-capital ratio,
It
Kt
, is an important factor
affecting the growth rate of the capital stock as well as the
price of capital. Use equation (7) to substitute for Yt in
equation (28) and divide both sides by Kt to obtain
It
Kt
5 cAkta21. (31)
where kt ;
Kt
Nt
. Now divide both sides of the capital adjust-
ment technology in equation (8) by Nt, and use the expres-
sion for the investment-capital ratio in equation (31) to
obtain
kt11ht11 5 acfAfkt12~12a!f. (32)
Take logarithms of both sides of equation (32) to obtain an
AR(1) process for ln kt11
ln kt11 5 @1 2 ~1 2 a!f# ln kt 1 ln a
1 f ln c 1 f ln A 2 ln ht11.
(33)
Because 0 , a , 1 and 0 , f , 1, ln kt11 follows a
stationary AR(1) process if the birth rate, ln ht11, is serially
uncorrelated. To analyze the impact of a bequest motive on
the accumulation of capital, recall from equation (30) that
the investment-output ratio, c, is an increasing function of
the bequest motive parameter g. Equation (33) implies that
an increase in g, which increases c, will increase the
average value of the capital-labor ratio but will not affect the
variance or serial correlation of ln kt11. More precisely, an
increase in g increases the mean of the stationary distribu-
tion of ln kt11 but has no effect on any autocovariances of
ln kt11.
The equilibrium value of the (logarithm of the) price of
capital is determined by substituting equation (31) into
equation (9) and taking logarithms of both sides of the
equation to obtain
ln qt 5 2ln fa 1 ~1 2 f! ln c
1 ~1 2 f! ln A 2 ~1 2 a!~1 2 f! ln kt.
(34)
Use equation (34) lagged one period to obtain an expression
for ln qt21. Then subtract [1 2 (1 2 a)f] ln qt21 from ln
qt, and use equation (33) to obtain
ln qt 5 @1 2 ~1 2 a!f# ln qt21
2 ~1 2 a!~f ln f 1 ln a!
1 ~1 2 a!~1 2 f! ln ht.
(35)
If the birth rate, ht, is serially uncorrelated, then the
(logarithm of the) equilibrium price of capital, ln qt, follows
a stationary AR(1) process, with the same serial correlation
9 Equations (28) and (29) may be derived alternatively as follows. The
cohort of consumers born at the beginning of period t owns the entire
capital stock, Kt11, at the beginning of period t 1 1. It acquires capital by
saving (1 2 a)Yt 2 Ct, and (see equation (21)) it inherits capital that has
a present value at the end of period t equal to
g
b 1 g SaYt 1 12ff ItD.
Therefore, the value at the end of period t of the capital stock carried into
period t 1 1 is qtKt11 5 (1 2 a)Yt 2 Ct 1
g
b 1 g SaYt 1 1 2 ff ItD.
Now use equation (10) to substitute 1
f
It for qtKt11, and use equation (24) for
Ct to obtain
1
f
It 5 (1 2 a)Yt 2
1
1 1 b 1 g FS1 2 bb 1 g aDYt 1 gb 1 g
1 2 f
f
ItG 1 gb 1 g SaYt 1 1 2 ff ItD. Simplifying this equation yields It 5
f
~1 2 a!b 1 g
1 1 b 1 gf Yt.
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as ln kt11, and this AR(1) process is independent of the
strength of the bequest motive g. Suppose that in period t 2
1 the price of capital equals its unconditional mean, and that
the realization of the birth rate, ht, is unusually large.
According to equation (35), this baby boom in period t
causes the price of capital, qt, to increase. If the birth rate is
serially uncorrelated, the price of capital is rationally antic-
ipated to fall back toward its unconditional mean in period
t 1 1. The magnitude of the anticipated drop in the price of
capital—or asset market meltdown—when the baby
boomers retire in period t 1 1 is independent of the strength
of the bequest motive. Therefore, the introduction of a
bequest motive does not attenuate the asset market melt-
down.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Poterba’s examination of age-specific asset holdings in
the Survey of Consumer Finances leads him to conclude
that consumers accumulate assets while they are of working
age, but that they hold on to these assets during retirement
much more than would be predicted by a simple life cycle
model without lifetime uncertainty and without a bequest
motive. He uses age-specific asset holdings, together with
age-specific population data and projections, to calculate a
time series of projected asset demand. He finds evidence
that the price-dividend ratio of stocks in the United States
has been positively related to his projected asset demand
variable in various historical sample periods. Looking into
the future, Poterba’s projected asset demand variable in-
creases over the next twenty years, and then remains fairly
constant. Because the projected asset demand does not
decline when the baby boomers retire, Poterba rejects the
asset market meltdown hypothesis, which predicts a decline
in stock prices when the baby boomers retire.
I have taken at face value Poterba’s finding about age-
specific asset holdings and his finding of a positive effect of
his projected asset demand on stock prices in historical data.
I have also taken at face value his finding that projected
asset demand will not fall when the baby boomers retire.
However, to understand the behavior of the price of capital,
it is important to take account of the supply of capital as
well as the demand for capital. To analyze the interaction of
the supply and demand for capital, I have developed a
rational expectations, general equilibrium model with a
bequest motive. This model is consistent with Poterba’s
observations that retired consumers continue to hold a
substantial amount of assets at the time of death and that a
baby boom can drive up the price of capital. However,
contrary to Poterba’s conclusion, there is an anticipated
decline in the price of capital when baby boomers retire, and
this decline is not attenuated by the introduction of a
bequest motive.
My finding that the equilibrium price of capital is invari-
ant to the bequest motive is a consequence of the particular
parametric specification of preferences and technology that
I use. I regard this invariance result as a rhetorical device to
make the point that one cannot predict the price of capital by
focusing on the demand for capital while ignoring its
supply. The effect of asset demands by retirees on asset
prices in a more general context remains an open question
worthy of further study. In considering the role of asset
demands by retirees in a more general framework, different
motives for these asset demands might be analyzed. Instead
of using the bequest motive specified in this paper, positive
asset demands by retirees can be generated by a bequest
motive based on altruism. Alternatively, precautionary sav-
ing to guard against longevity risk in the absence of perfect
annuity markets would be a way to generate a demand for
assets by retired consumers. Another direction for explora-
tion is to examine alternative forms of the aggregate supply
curve of capital, especially because this paper has illustrated
the potentially important role of the supply of capital in
determining the equilibrium price of capital.
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